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STAVING OFF THE PILLAGE OF THE
VILLAGE: DOES INRE WAL-MART STORES,
INC. OFFER HOPE TO SMALL MERCHANTS
STRUGGLING FOR ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
AGAINST BOX RETAILERS?
Vermont's history speaks of rugged individualism: the state once
operated as an independent republic, and generations of its residents
have made their living through farming, despite adverse climate
conditions. In the town of St. Albans, the spirit of hearty
individualism has proven particularly strong. St. Albans has been
attacked twice in the past 133 years.' The first invasion occurred
during the Civil War when Confederate raiders crossed the Canadian
border, vandalized the unsuspecting town, and robbed three of its
banks.2 The more recent attack was by Wal-Mart.3 The battleground
was a few miles north of St. Albans's historic downtown, on an
abandoned dairy farm where the world's largest retailer sought to
build a 126,000-square-foot discount store.4 Vermonters opposed the
building of this store,5 and, in contrast to the Civil War skirmish, the
1. See Tom Condon, State Needs Law for Protection of Scenic Vistas, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 9, 1997, at A3 (discussing the siege on St. Albans by 22 Confederate soldiers
that occurred on October 19, 1864). Known mostly to Civil War aficionados, the "St. Albans
Raid" was the northernmost encounter of the war. See id.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Sally Johnson, Vermonters are Up Against the Wal-Mart, INSIGHT MAG., Jan. 10,
1994, at 12.
5. Well-organized opposition to a proposed Wal-Mart store is not unique to Vermont
Small merchants and community preservationists across the country, particularly in the
northeast, have ardently protested the expansion of Wal-Mart into their communities. See, e.g.,
Jon Rutter, Wal-Mart Prompts Protest, LANCASTER NEW ERA, May 11, 1997, at B1; Mary
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residents of St. Albans fought back fiercely6 and won.7
In August 1997, the Supreme Court of Vermont unanimously
upheld a decision invalidating a state land use permit for the
proposed Wal-Mart store.8 In In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,9 the court
concluded that, in invalidating the permit, Vermont's Environmental
Board had properly considered the store's potential adverse effects on
existing competitors and the expected additional costs of municipal
services resulting from urban sprawl. 10
The court's conclusion that the Environmental Board properly
considered Wal-Mart's projected impact on competition contradicts a
well-established principal of zoning law: control of competition is not
a proper zoning law purpose." A zoning ordinance may not exclude a
Ellen Godin, Plainville Residents Rally Against Wal-Mart, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 17,
1994, at B1; Ellen Goodman, Sturbridge, Mass.: One Town's Fight Against Wal-Mart,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Oct. 3, 1994, at All; Little Vermont a Big Adversary to Wal-
Mart, FIN. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at 27 [hereinafter Little Vermont]. Many opponents believe that
the opening of big-box discount stores like Wal-Mart will hasten the demise of downtown
business districts as shoppers flock to the sprawling megastores on the edge of town. One media
story aptly stated:
Wal-Mart is considered so threatening because it is so good at what it does. The
company's modus operandi is to set up shop just outside a town, then undercut local
retail prices. Often it acts as a magnet for satellite businesses-gas stations and fast-
food restaurants, for instance-creating a new retail center that draws customers from
downtown.
Johnson, supra note 4, at 14.
6. See Little Vermont, supra note 5. Until recently, Vermont was the only state in the
nation without a Wal-Mart store. See Wal-Mart Trims its Store to Gain Foothold in Vermont,
THE N.J. REc., Aug. 18, 1994, at D2 [hereinafter Wal-Mart Trims]. Compared with other states,
Vermont has enjoyed relative success in containing the urban sprawl that has often
accompanied the opening of new Wal-Mart stores. See Condon, supra note 1. For example,
Wal-Mart stores in Bennington and Rutland, Vermont were built in buildings formerly
occupied by department stores. See id. A Wal-Mart store in suburban Williston, Vermont won
approval, despite local opposition, because the area had already been developed. See id.
7. See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 401-02. The court reasoned, in part, that a municipality's ability to provide
essential services depends upon its tax base. See id. Therefore, the court concluded, if a
proposed project will likely harm existing competitors so as to weaken the tax base, the local
government may regulate that project in the interest of the general welfare of it citizens. See id.
at401.
11. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.28 (4th ed. 1997). However, even if
a state court holds a zoning restriction invalid because its primary purpose is to control
competition, the local government still will probably be immune from federal antitrust liability.
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particular land use merely because it will compete with an existing
business. 12 However, if the exclusionary effect is merely incidental to
an otherwise valid zoning purpose, the ordinance may not be
invalid. 3
A crucial aspect of the In re Wal-Mart case is that the
Environmental Board's decision prohibiting construction of a new
store near St. Albans was not based on a zoning ordinance. Instead,
the Environmental Board based its decision on an interpretation of
Act 250, Vermont's land use and development law.' 4 Act 250 is
unique among state growth-management statutes in that it provides
for direct state-level control of new development by mandating case-
by-case review of large building projects.' 5 In contrast to Vermont,
land use control in most other states is the prerogative of local
See id. § 5.44. Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade in interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Supreme Court,
however, has adopted the position that states are absolutely immune from antitrust liability. See
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). This rule is known as the state action doctrine. In City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), the Court held that the state
action doctrine protected a municipality from antitrust liability allegedly arising from a
billboard zoning ordinance that benefited one advertiser while severely hindering its
competitor. See id. at 372. The Court held that the city obtained state action immunity from its
"unquestioned zoning power over the size, location, and spacing of billboards," authorized by
the state's zoning-enabling act. See id.
12. SeeMANDELKER, supranote 11, § 5.28.
13. See Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 255 A.2d 804, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969)
(holding that zoning ordinance restricting retail sales to a central business district is not invalid
when the purpose is to revitalize the central business area rather than exclude or benefit any
particular business); Van Sicklen v. Browne, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (upholding
a planning commission's denial of a special permit for a gas station where there was no
demonstrated need for an additional station in the neighborhood). In Van Sicklen, the court
stated that "so long as the primary purpose of the zoning ordinance is not to regulate
competition, but to subserve a valid objective pursuant to a city's police powers, such ordinance
is not invalid even though it might have an indirect impact on economic competition." Id. at
790.
14. See 702 A.2d at 400; VT. STAT. ANN. tit 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1997) ("Act 250"). Land
use decisions based on Act 250 may qualify as state action. See Parker, 317 U.S. 341.
Regardless of whether decisions based on Act 250 qualify as strictly state action, the decisions
are likely immune from antitrust liability. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 384 (recognizing state action
immunity for municipalities enacting zoning regulations).
15. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001(3), 6081(a). These sections require developers to
obtain a permit for construction "involving more than 10 acres of land within a radius of five
miles of any point on any involved land, for commercial or industrial purposes." Id. § 6001(3);
see also infra Part II.A.
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government. 16 In such other states, the majority of land use decisions
are implemented through zoning statutes enacted in accordance with
community-level land use plans.
17
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision in In re Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. 18 has potentially far-reaching implications for commercial
development throughout the nation. Because land use decisions in
most other states are effectuated through zoning ordinances, the
potential impact of this decision requires one to compare it to similar
cases decided according to zoning law principles. One such decision
is Forte v. Borough of Tenafly,19 which held that a municipality may
zone to restrict retail sales to a central business district in an effort to
revitalize the area, even though the incidental effect might be to grant
the business district a virtual monopoly over retail business.20 Forte
suggests that, under appropriate circumstances, a court in another
state could reach an outcome similar to that in In re Wal-Mart, albeit
on different grounds.
A discussion of the Wal-Mart decision and its implications must
begin with an understanding of Act 250 and how it differs from the
dominant approaches to land use control in the United States. Part I
of this Recent Development surveys Vermont's environmental and
statutory history, which is essential to understanding the unique
aspects of Act 250. Part II describes the significant provisions of Act
250 and how they were interpreted to prevent construction of a Wal-
Mart store near St. Albans, Vermont Part III compares the overall
design of Act 250 to approaches to land use law in other states,
focusing on the distinction between state and local control of land
uses. Finally, Part IV compares the In re Wal-Mart and Forte
16. See George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth Management: Vermont, Oregon, and
a Synthesis, 10-VTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13 (1996). In 1922, the U.S. Department of
Commerce published the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, a model statute designed to
encourage local zoning. See id. The United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of local
zoning in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Nearly every
state now has a zoning-enabling act that authorizes municipal governments to enact zoning
ordinances. Presently, more than ten thousand local governments exercise zoning power. See
Gay, supra, at 13.
17. See Gay, supra note 16, at 13.
18. 702 A.2d 397.
19. 255 A.2d 804.
20. See id. at 806.
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decisions in an effort to anticipate the likelihood that a decision
similar to In re Wal-Mart will occur in another jurisdiction.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF AcT 250
Vermont is a state known for extraordinary natural beauty. In the
view of one scholar, Vermont's Act 250 is a reflection of the state's
ecology:2 "[B]ehind Act 250 is a shared cultural image of Vermont,
a rugged pastoral ideal originally informed and shaped by farming
and logging in a beautiful natural environment." 22 Vermont is a rural
state without a major urban center. Its population lives in small
towns, which are the basic units of local government2 3 In recent
years, intense pressure for growth, particularly in the form of strip
malls and shopping centers, has threatened the image of the
traditional Vermont town. 4 The potential for urban sprawl even
prompted the National Trust for Historic Preservation to include the
entire state of Vermont on its list of America's Most Endangered
Places.25
Concern over the sustainability of development in Vermont is not
of recent origin. It first attracted political attention in the 1960s, when
21. See RICHARD O. BROOKS, TOWARD COMMUNITY SUSTAINABIL1TY: VERMONT'S ACT
250, ch. 2, at 1, 6. (1997). Vermont's climate is relatively cold and the growing season is short.
Despite generally nutrient-poor soils, much of the state's land is devoted to farming. See id.
22. See id. at 1. Professor Brooks further contends that:
An understanding of this image, its components of myth and reality, and the actual
natural environment which lies behind the image will not only provide a context for
comprehending the discussions of specific provisions of Act 250 and the court and
Environmental Board decisions. Such an understanding will also shed light upon the
history and structure of Act 250 itself and its niche within Vermont.
Id.
23. Government in Vermont consists of the state, 250 towns and moderate-sized cities,
and 50 incorporated villages. See id. Vermont towns are unlike incorporated municipalities in
other states. Each town has authority over all of the land in its jurisdiction that falls outside of
the organized cities. See David G. Heeter, Almost Getting it Together in Vermont, in DANIEL K.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 323, 325 (1976).
24. See Jessica E. Jay, Note, The "Mailing" of Vermont: Can the "Growth Center"
Designation Save the Traditional Village from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REV. 929, 937
(1997). As one recent media article pointed out, of all the New England states, only Vermont
remains known for what the entire region once symbolized: quiet villages clustered among
rolling hills. See Jonathan Walters, State of Grace: Vermont Makes its Stand against Suburban
Sprawl, USA TODAY, July 20, 1993, at ID.
25. See Walters, supra note 24.
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
328 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 54:323
dramatic increases in population and development brought about by
the completion of an interstate highway system began to take their
toll on Vermont's physical environment.
26
Rural towns in southern Vermont, which were most acutely
affected by the new development, responded by exercising planning
and zoning powers. These initial efforts were rudimentary. 8
Vermont's state government began to act by authorizing local
planning commissions and delegating a wide array of planning and
zoning powers to local governments.
2f
At the same time, environmental activists throughout the country
began to question whether local zoning controls could adequately
address the myriad recurring environmental problems confronting the
nation.30 The federal government responded to the public's demand
for change, 31 but citizens in several states, including Vermont, voiced
concerns about the ineffectual federal leadership.32
26. See Heeter, supra note 23, at 327 & n.6. Within ten years, Vermont's population
increased by 14 percent, due in part to the growth of tourism, particularly in the ski industry.
See id. at 326. Interstate highways, completed in the 1960s, made the small Vermont towns
much more accessible to visitors. See id. The increase in permanent and seasonal populations
created greater demand for land upon which to build houses. See id. at 326-27. Several large
developments were either built or proposed in the mid-1960s. See2 BROOKS, supra note 21, ch.
5, at 32. These developments placed tremendous burdens on the state's infrastructure,
transforming once pristine streams into sewers. See Heeter, supra note 23, at 327.
27. See Heeter, supra note 23, at 327.
28. See id.
29. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4495 (1992).
30. See Gay, supra note 16, at 13. These problems included large-scale development that
crossed municipal boundaries, urban sprawl, loss of open spaces, and degradation of significant
natural resources such as wetlands, coastlines, and endangered and threatened species. See id.
31. See id. The federal government responded by conditioning aid grants for
transportation and community development projects on metropolitan planning. See id. In
addition, Congress passed the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, which contained broad
goals for alleviating regional pollution. See id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 (1994). Moreover, the National Environmental Policy Act required the preparation of an
environmental impact statement for all major federal activities significantly affecting the
environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994).
32. See Gay, supra note 16, at 14. The first state to adopt a land use control program was
Hawaii in 1961. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 797 (3d ed. 1990). Between 1970 and 1974, several other
states, including Vermont, enacted growth management statutes. See Vermont State Land Use
and Development Act of 1970, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 250 (codified as amended at VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6108 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Florida Environmental Land and Water
Management Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 317 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ch. 380
(1997)); Oregon State Land Use Act of 1973, 1973 Or. Laws 80 (codified as amended at OR.
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State officials in Vermont began to see that a mounting
developmental crisis confronted the entire state. In May 1969,
Vermont's governor appointed a Commission on Environmental
Control to investigate how the state could sustain economic growth
without destroying the environment.33 The Commission issued a
report in January 1970 that took a broad view of Vermont's
environmental problems. The report concluded that the state's
ecological balance was fragile, particularly at elevations above 2,500
feet, and was in jeopardy from large-scale development.34 The
Commission's recommendations to the governor formed the basis of
Act 250 as originally proposed in the legislature."
II. LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN VERMONT
The Vermont legislature adopted Act 250 in 1970 as part of a
REv. STAT. § 197 (1991)); and the Colorado Land Use Act of 1974 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65-101 to 24-65.1-502 (West 1990)). Two leading authors have
referred to this wave of land use control programs as a "Quiet Revolution." See F. BOSSELMAN
& D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
These initial state growth management programs were of two distinct types: Vermont's
state level case-by-case review of development projects and Oregon's state level oversight of
local development planning. See Gay, supra note 16, at 14.
33. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch. 5, at 2. The Commission was headed by Rep. Arthur
Gibb and consisted of Vermont's leading environmentalists, political leaders, and businessmen,
who were advised by a large panel of citizens and environmentalists. See id. The Gibb
Commission, as the group became known, appointed subcommittees to study the impact of
large-scale development on the state's water supply, open spaces, waste disposal, power
consumption, and pesticide use. See id. The Commission also reviewed reports on air pollution
and herbicides. See id.
34. See id. at 2 (citing GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, REPORTS
TO GOVERNOR 1, 2 (1970)). According to the report, large-scale housing developments,
pesticide applications, industrial pollution, public waste disposal, the building of dams, and air
pollution threatened the environment. See id.
35. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch. 5, at 3 (citing GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL). The Gibb Commission recommended the total reorganization of
the state's management of environmental policy through the creation of an Agency of
Environmental Conservation, as well as local environmental commissions. See id. (citing
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL). The Commission also advised that the
state immediately implement broad regulations to which large subdivisions and developments
would be required to conform. See id. Finally, it recommended that the state prepare a
comprehensive development plan and require large developments to comply with it. See id. The
Gibb Commission's report was followed by the passage of nine major environmental initiatives
in March and April 1970, including Act 250. See id.
1998]
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wave of state laws intended to protect the environment.36 Prior to the
enactment of Act 250, land use regulation in Vermont was achieved
primarily through municipal and regional land use decision-making
and planning.37 Act 250 did not supplant local control of land use
decisions. Rather, it ensured a system of concurrent control, both at
the state and municipal levels, by providing an overlay on local
planning and zoning.
38
36. See id. at 1. The proposed Act 250 (H.417) was approved and signed by the governor
of Vermont on April 4, 1970. See id. at 12 (citing JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, State of Vermont,
Adjourned Session, at 630-41 (1970)).
37. The enactment of local and regional land use laws in Vermont is authorized by the
Vermont Municipal and Regional Planning and Development Act, also referred to as the
Vermont Planning and Development Act. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4494 (1997).
Both the Vermont Planning and Development Act and Act 250 contain provisions defining the
complex relationship between state and local regulation of Vermont's land use decisions. See
BROOKS, supra note 21, ch.12, at 1.
The Vermont Planning and Development Act was amended in 1988 by the Vermont
Growth Management Act, which strengthened the state and regional planning process. See
Theodore C. Taub, Update on Local Growth Management, C431 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1097, 1099
(1989). The Vermont Planning and Development Act, as amended by Act 200, provides for the
creation of regional planning commissions that must prepare regional development plans to
guide and encourage appropriate economic development. See Brooks, supra note 21, ch. 12, at
3; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 4341, 4345a, 4347, 4348. (1997). Participation in the Act
200 program by local governments is voluntary. However, if a local growth management plan is
not approved under Act 200, only the regional plan, and not the local plan, will be considered
during the Act 250 permit-review process. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 867 (4th ed. 1995).
38. The state supreme court characterized the role of Act 250 in the following terms:
"[Act 250 does] not purport to reach all land use changes within the state .... or interfere with
local control of land use decisions, except where values of state concern are implicated through
large scale changes in land utilization." In re Agency of Admin., 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Vt.
1982) (reprinted in DANIEL R. MANDELKER Er AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT 866 (4th ed. 1995)).
The Vermont Supreme Court considered the interaction between the Act 250 growth-
management criteria, discussed infra Part II.B, and local zoning law in In re Patch, 437 A.2d
121 (Vt. 1981). In that case, an applicant sought permission to build a sanitary landfill dump.
See id. at 122. The town's agencies refused to approve a site plan and conditional use permit.
See id. The district commission, however, granted an Act 250 land use permit subject to
conditions. See id. The applicant appealed and the case was removed to the Rutland Superior
Court, which denied both the Act 250 permit and the local zoning approvals in a de novo
proceeding. See id. at 123. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to the Act 250 permit,
reasoning that the Act 250 criteria at issue would be satisfied. See id. at 126. However, the court
affirmed the denial of the zoning permit on the ground that the zoning application raised a
concern different from the Act 250 permit. See id. The zoning issue focused on the negative
impact that the landfill likely would have on the value of adjoining property due to possible
pollution. See id. at 128. The court concluded, "The trial court was well within the evidence in
reaching the conclusion that property salability might well be adversely affected by a possible
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/15
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A. The Form ofAct 250
Act 250 has undergone five major changes in the quarter-century
since its adoption, but its basic form has remained intact.39 The most
distinguishing feature of Act 250, as originally adopted, was its
requirement of a statewide land use plan that would enable
centralized state development planning. 40 Despite the requirement in
the statute that the legislature adopt a state land use plan, the land use
plan never gained approval. 41 As a result, Act 250, which originally
provided for comprehensive state-level planning, became a
mechanism for more decentralized decision-making on an
incremental, case-by-case basis.42
Act 250 was a legislative response to growing development
pressures on Vermont's ecologically fragile environment.
Accordingly, Act 250 regulates new large subdivisions and
developments by means of a state permit program.4 3 In general,
subdivisions exceeding ten lots and developments involving ten or
more acres of land require an Act 250 permit.44 Act 250 created nine
'cloud' on water supply." Id.
39. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch.5, at 1.
40. See id. at 8. The original bill provided for a series of three statewide plans: an "interim
land capability plan," describing the current uses of the land and its capacity for development
based on ecological factors (§6041); a "capability and development plan," which was to guide
coordinated economic development of the state (§6042); and a "land use plan" consisting of a
map that would set out broad categories of proper uses of the land based on the capability and
development plan (§6043). See id
41. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch. 5, at 1. This failure was largely the result of an
economic recession during the 1973-74 legislative session that caused a downturn in the real
estate market and shifted public concern from environmental protection to unemployment See
id In addition, in 1974, a new democratic governor, who originally opposed the adoption of
Act 250, took office. See id During the 1975 and 1976 sessions, state legislators made
additional attempts to pass a state land use plan, but these efforts also failed. See Heeter, supra
note 23, at 370. Eventually, the requirement was repealed. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch. 5, at
17 (citing H.82, 57th Biennial Adj. Sess., 1984 Vt Acts & Resolves 35 (Act No. 114), which
deleted reference to the land use plan in § 6044).
In 1988, the Vermont legislature approved a new growth management statute, Act 200,
which it intended to supplement legislation adopted in 1970, including Act 250. See Taub,
supra note 37, at 1097, 1099.
42. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch. 5, at .
43. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (1997).
44. See id. "Development" means any commercial or industrial development "involving
more than 10 acres of land within a radius of five miles." Id. "Development" also means "the
construction of housing projects... with 10 or more units, constructed or maintained on a tract
1998]
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district environmental commissions throughout the state. The power
to issue permits is vested in the district commissions. Appeals from
district commissions' decisions may be taken to the Vermont
Environmental Board or to a trial court, and from there directly to the
state supreme court.
46
A developer seeking an Act 250 permit first must apply to the
appropriate district commission. The commission must offer an
opportunity for a fair hearing to all relevant parties and, after the
hearing, decide whether to grant or deny the permit.47 Complete
denial of an Act 250 permit, as occurred in In re Wal-Mart, is
exceedingly rare. In most instances, the district commission or the
Environmental Board will issue a permit subject to certain
conditions,48 but will not stop the proposed development or
subdivision from being built.
B. Specific Criteria ofAct 250
Act 250 originally included ten statutory criteria to be considered
by the district commissions and the Environmental Board in deciding
or tracts of land. ... within a radius of five miles" and the "construction of improvements" for
municipal or state purposes on more than 10 acres of land. Id. Because Act 250 applies only to
new large-scale developments, rather than to existing developments, the Wal-Mart stores in
Williston and Rutland, Vermont, which occupy buildings once used by department stores, were
not subject to Act 250 review. See id.
45. See BROOKS, supra note 21, ch. 5, at 6. The Act 250 districts roughly correspond to
the various topographic features of the state. According to Professor Brooks, the decentralized
commissions reflect Vermont's tradition of the town meeting form of government. See id. ch. 2,
at 1. Each district commission consists of three citizens who are appointed by the governor and
assisted by a staff. See id. ch. 5, at 4.
46. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6081-6089 (1997). A party wishing to appeal a district
commission decision must file a notice of appeal with the Environmental Board within 30 days
of that decision. See id. § 6089(a)(4). A statement of the issues to be addressed in the appeal
must accompany the notice of appeal, which will govern the scope of the appellate hearing
before the Environmental Board. See id. § 6089(a)(2). The Board will conduct a de novo
hearing on all findings requested by any party who files an appeal or cross appeal. See id.
§ 6089(a)(3). The Vermont Supreme Court may hear appeals of Environmental Board
decisions, but the standard of appellate review is very deferential. "The [factual] findings of the
board .... if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, shall be conclusive."
Id. § 6089(c)(d).
47. See id. § 6085. If a permit application is denied, the district commission or the
Environmental Board must state the specific reasons for the denial. See id. § 6087(c).
48. See id. § 6086(c) ("A permit may contain such requirements and conditions as are
allowable proper exercise of the police power.").
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whether to grant a permit.49 These criteria address pollution
prevention, preservation of important natural resources, and the
provision of adequate governmental and educational services.5 ' The
Act 250 criteria were derived in part from the common law of
nuisance. However, the criteria go beyond the common law by
broadening the kinds of harms to be regulated and by lessening the
relevant burdens of proof.51 The criteria also demand a higher
standard of conduct among developers without regard to the cost-
benefit analysis of private nuisance law. 2
In addition to its ten original criteria, Act 250 also includes
revised criteria that specifically address growth management
concerns, including the impact of population growth and the costs of
scattered development.5 3  These criteria require the district
49. See id. § 6086(a). Section 6086(a) requires findings by the district commission or the
Environmental Board that the subdivision or development:
(1) Will not result in undue water or air pollution ....
(2) Does have water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs of the subdivision
or development.
(3) Will not cause an unreasonable burden on an existing water supply, if one is to be
utilized.
(4) Will not cause unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity of the land to
hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy condition may result.
(5) Will not cause unreasonable congestion or unsafe conditions with respect to use of
the highways, waterways, railways, airports and airways, and other means of
transportation existing or proposed.
(6) Will not cause an unreasonable burden on the ability of a municipality to provide
educational services.
(7) Will not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of the local governments to
provide municipal or governmental services.
(8) Will not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty of the area,
aesthetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable natural areas.
(9) Is in conformance with a duly adopted capability and development plan, and land
use plan when adopted ....
(10) Is in conformance with any duly adopted local or regional plan ....
Id.
50. See id. § 6086(a).
51. See id. § 6088. According to § 6088, the burden of proof is on the permit applicant
with respect to criteria (1), (2), (3), (4), (9) and (10) of § 6086(a). See id. However, any party
opposing the applicant has the burden of proof with regard to criteria (5) through (8) of
§ 6086(a). See id.
52. See I RICHARD 0. BROOKS, TOWARD COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY: VERMONT'S
ACT 250 at 10-11 (1997) (citing Upper Valley Regional Landfill, Land Use Permit Application
#3R0609-EB, 1991 WL 277851 (Vt. Envtl. Bd., Nov. 12,1991)).
53. See § 6086(a)(9XA), (H). These criteria were added to the statute in 1973. See Brooks,
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commissions and the Environmental Board to consider as part of the
application review process the anticipated additional costs of
education, public services, and facilities associated with a proposed
development.54 The Environmental Board denied Wal-Mart's Act
250 permit for the proposed store near St. Albans based on Criteria
9(A), relating to the impact of growth, and 9(H) relating to the costs
of scattered development.55
The Act 250 criteria were first tested twenty years ago in In re
Pyramid Mall Co., 56 a case that arose outside Burlington, Vermont.
Although the Vermont Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of
that case,57 it is an important decision in the history of Act 250
because of the factual similarities it shares with In re Wal-Mart.
C. The Pyramid Mall Case
The Pyramid Mall case concerned a developer's proposal to build
a large suburban shopping mall on a 200-acre tract located six miles
from the central business district of Burlington. 58 The site was located
near an isolated strip development, close to the intersection of two
interstate highways, in an otherwise rural area.59 Before commencing
supra 21, ch. 5, at 14.
54. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A) (1997). Criterion 9(A) concerns the
impact of population growth. See id. It requires consideration of "the growth in population
experienced by the town and region in question and whether or not the proposed development
would significantly affect their existing and potential financial capacity to reasonably
accommodate both the total growth and the rate of growth which would result from the
development if approved." Id. Specifically, the district commission or the Environmental Board
must evaluate the expected costs for "education, highway access and maintenance, sewage
disposal, water supply, police and fire services and other factors relating to the public health,
safety, and welfare." Id.
55. Criterion 9(H) addresses the costs of scattered development. See § 6086(a)(9)(H). It
provides that a permit will be granted for a development "which is not physically contiguous to
an existing settlement whenever it is demonstrated that . . . the additional costs of public
services and facilities caused directly or indirectly by the proposed development ... do not
outweigh the tax revenue and other public benefits of the development... such as increased
employment... ? Id.
56. Vt. Dist. Envtl. Comm'n No. 4, No 4C0281, 1978, appeal dismissed, In re Pyramid
Co., 449 A.2d 915 (Vt. 1982).
57. See In re Pyramid, 449 A.2d at 922.
58. See id. at 915. For a discussion of the history of the Pyramid Mall litigation, see
MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 37, at 869.
59. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 37, at 869.
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construction, the developer had to obtain an Act 250 permit.6°
According to studies submitted to the District Environmental
Commission during the case, the mall would attract forty percent of
the existing businesses in downtown Burlington.61 The Commission
found that such economic dislocation would negatively impact the
city's financial condition and, accordingly, denied the permit
application.6 a The Commission held that the developer failed to
satisfy the scattered development criterion set forth in Act 250.63
Specifically, the Commission concluded that the scattered
development criterion required consideration of the costs that the
mall would impose on nearby Burlington and other municipalities as
well as the costs it would impose at the site of the mall.64 The
Commission found that the relocation of businesses from Burlington
would shrink the city's property tax base and create tax revenue
losses that would ultimately require higher taxes or a reduction in city
services. 65 The Commission further found that other municipalities
would also suffer tax losses.66 The most noteworthy aspect of the
Commission's decision was its conclusion that economic impacts
were cognizable under Act 250.67
In response to the Commission's findings, the developer appealed
to a trial court and moved for summary judgment, contending that the
Commission's interpretation of Act 250 was erroneous. 68 The trial
court denied the motion for summary judgment but granted leave to
seek an interlocutory appeal. 69 The Vermont Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and thereby declined to rule
on whether Act 250 encompassed economic impacts of proposed
development.70
60. See In re Pyramid, 449 A.2d at 917.
61. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 37, at 814.
62. See id.
63. See id. For a discussion of the scattered development criterion, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
64. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 37, at 869.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See In re Pyramid, 449 A.2d at 917.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 915. The court concluded that the issues were not ripe for appellate review
in the context of an interlocutory appeal. See id. at 919-22. The court reasoned that the appeal
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D. The St. Albans Wal-Mart Case
In In re Wal-Mart,"' the Vermont Supreme Court conclusively
determined that the economic impact of a development that is subject
to Act 250 review may be a relevant factor in the decision to grant or
deny a land use permit.72 Specifically, the court concluded that the
Environmental Board may consider a project's anticipated impact on
market competition because "[t]o the extent that a project's impact on
existing retail stores negatively affects appraised property values,
such impact is a factor that relates to the public health, safety, and
welfare."
73
The proposed Wal-Mart store was to be erected on a site located
about two miles north of St. Albans's historic downtown. Because the
development would involve forty-four acres, more than the ten-acre
threshold under Act 250, a permit was required.74 In September 1993,
Wal-Mart filed an application under Act 250 for a permit to build the
store.75 The District Six Commission granted a permit for the project
finding that the application satisfied each of the Act 250 growth-
76
management criteria.
A local downtown preservation group and the Vermont Natural
Resources Council appealed the decision to the Environmental
Board.77 The Environmental Board conducted a de novo review of
order did not involve a "controlling question of law," there was not a "substantial ground for
difference of opinion" as to the correctness of the order, and the appeal would not "materially
advance the termination of the litigation." See id. The court explained that even if the questions
certified for appellate review were resolved in the appellant's favor, the development still
would be required to satisfy all of the criteria under Act 250, many of which were not before the
Court for review, before a permit would be granted. See id. at 920. Accordingly, "[a] complex
trial involving numerous issues would still be necessary to resolve this case." See id.
71. 702 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997).
72. Seeid. at401.
73. Id.
74. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001(3), 6081(a).
75. See In re Wal-Mart, 702 A.2d at 400.
76. See id. Several parties participated in the proceedings before the District Six
Commission and the Vermont Environmental Board. See id. The permit applicants were the St.
Albans Group, which owned the land upon which the proposed store was to be built, and Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (the "Applicants"). See id. The Applicants were opposed by the
Franklin/Grand Isle County Citizens for Downtown Preservation (the "Citizens") and the
Vermont Natural Resources Council ("VNRC"). See id.
77. See id. The Citizens challenged the District Commission's decision with respect to the
following Act 250 criteria: 1 (water pollution), 1(B) (waste disposal), I(E) (streams), I(G)
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the appealed criteria and rejected the permit application based on
Criteria 9(A) (addressing the impact of growth) and 9(H) (addressing
the costs of scattered development).78
The Environmental Board made findings of fact relevant to each
of the appealed criteria. Notably, the Board found that although the
proposed project, in and of itself, would cause little population
growth, it would likely encourage and accelerate other highway-
oriented development, or secondary growth, in the area of the
proposed project. 79  Additionally, the Board found that such
accelerated development could significantly increase the costs of
providing municipal services. 80  The Board also found that
competition from the proposed project would cause losses in property
tax revenue due to changes in the tax base, and that such losses would
adversely affect St. Albans's downtown, where most of the existing
retail businesses were located.81
The Board concluded that the effect of the project on retail
(wetlands), 4 (soil erosion), 5 (traffic), 6 (impact on schools), 7 (local government services), 8
(historic sites), 9(A) (impact of growth), 9(H) (costs of scattered development), and 10
(conformity with local plan). See In re St. Albans Group, 1994 WL 739724, at *3 (Vt. Envtl.
Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). The Commission granted the Citizens party status with respect to Criteria 7,
8, 9(A), 9(H), and 9(K) and denied them party status on the remainder. See id. The Citizens
appealed the denial of party status. See id. The VNRC's challenge was more limited. It
appealed the Commission's decision with respect to Criteria 8 (historic sites), 9(A), 9(H), 9(K),
and 10. See id. VNRC sought, and was denied, party status with respect to these criteria and
appealed that denial. See id. The Applicants cross-appealed, challenging the District
Commission's grant of party status to the Citizens with regard to Criteria 7, 8, 9(A), 9(H), and
9(K). See id.
78. See In re St. Albans Group, 1994 WL 739724, at *40. The Board also reviewed the St.
Albans Wal-Mart project under several ecologically related criteria of Act 250, including those
criteria addressing headwaters, waste disposal, streams, wetland rules, and soil erosion. See id.
at "5. The Board found that the project complied with all of the ecologically related criteria
under review. Id. at *7-* 11, *41. The Board also found that the project complied with Criterion
9(K), concerning public investments and facilities. See id. at *41; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 6086(a) (1997).
79. See In reSt. Albans Group, 1994 WL 739724, at *12.
80. See id. at *12-*13. The Environmental Board also found that the Applicants failed to
sustain their burden of proof with regard to Criterion 9(H), addressing the impact of growth. See
ud According to the Board, the Applicants offered no credible evidence as to the total amount
of commercial or residential development that was likely to occur as a result of the project or
whether the public benefits would outweigh the public costs. See id.
81. See id. at *13-*14. In addition, the Environmental Board found that the proposed
project would result in a net job loss for the region of approximately 130 jobs in 2004 and that
such job loss would cause property tax revenues to decline by $50,000, measured in 1995
dollars, in 2004. See id. at *14.
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competition was a common factor relevant to all the fiscal criteria on
appeal before the Board. 2 The Board reasoned that to the extent a
proposed development might have a substantial adverse economic
impact on existing businesses, such development might weaken the
tax base and, consequently, impinge upon the local government's
ability to provide educational and other public services.83 The Board
concluded that the legislature had intended for it to consider any
reduction in the tax base caused by a proposed development in its
review under Act 250.84 Accordingly, the Environmental Board
voided Wal-Mart's Act 250 permit on December 23, 1994.5 Wal-
Mart filed a motion to modify the decision, which the Board denied
before entering its final order on June 27, 1995.86
The Applicants appealed the Environmental Board's decision to
the Vermont Supreme Court. The court affirmed the Board's
interpretation of Act 250 based upon a deferential level of review.
87
According to the court, the language of Act 250 amply supported the
Board's conclusion that a project's impact on market competition is a
relevant consideration under the Act 250 criteria relating to growth,
education, and municipal services.
88
82. See id. at *18. The fiscal criteria on appeal were Criteria 6 (impact on schools), 7
(local governmental services), 9(A) (impact of growth), 9(H) (costs of scattered development),
and 9(K) (public investments and facilities). See id. The Board stated that "impacts of the
proposed project on existing retail competition are relevant to the extent that such impacts will
in turn affect the finances of local, regional, or state government." Id.
83. Id. at *19 (citing In re Pyramid Co. of Burlington, No. 4C0821, at 8 (Vt. Dist. Envtl.
Comm'n Oct. 12, 1978)).
84. Id.at*18.
85. See In re Wal-Mart, 702 A.2d at 400. The Environmental Board also concluded that
the proposed development failed to satisfy the Act 250 criteria concerning impact on education
and impact on municipal services. See id. However, an Act 250 permit may not be denied solely
on these grounds. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6087(b) (1997).
86. See In re Wal-Mart, 702 A.2d at 400. Pursuant to Section 6087(c), the Board granted
Wal-Mart permission for reconsideration, provided that Wal-Mart offer a credible study of
secondary-growth impacts and recommend a permit condition to ensure that the public benefits
of the project would outweigh the public costs to any affected municipality. See id. Wal-Mart
declined this invitation, preferring to appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court. See id.
87. See id. at 400; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089(c).
88. See In re Wal-Mart, 702 A.2d at 401. The court noted that § 6086(a)(9)(A) (impact of
growth) specifically requires the Board to consider the "financial capacity" of the town and the
region to accommodate growth. See id. Because the court affirmed the denial of the permit
based on Wal-Mart's failure to meet its burden under Criterion 9(A), it did not reach the
secondary growth issues raised by the Environmental Board under Criterion 9(H) (impact of
scattered development). See id. at 400 n.2.
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III. THE DOMINANT APPROACH TO LAND USE CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES
The most noteworthy aspect of the In re Wal-Mart decision is the
court's conclusion that the Environmental Board properly considered
the effects on market competition in denying Wal-Mart an Act 250
permit. This conclusion appears to offer hope to small communities
across the country whose viability depends upon the economic
strength of its small retailers. However, Vermont's Act 250 is unique
among state land use laws, and anticipating the implications of this
decision requires an understanding of how Act 250 differs from the
approach to land use control adopted in most other states.
As previously described, Act 250 requires direct state-level review
of development projects meeting minimum jurisdictional
requirements.8 9 In contrast to the Vermont model, the dominant
approach to land use regulation in the United States is local control of
land use through "Euclidian" zoning.9° Zoning-enabling legislation,
adopted in all 50 states, allows local governments to divide
municipalities into zoning districts that regulate both the type and
density of land use.91 Typically, a zoning code will partition a
municipality into residential, commercial, and industrial zones.
92
Restrictions must be uniform for each class or kind of building
89. See supra Part II.A-B.
90. The term "Euclidean zoning" refers to the zoning model upheld by the Supreme Court
against a due process challenge in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
For further discussion of the source of Euclidean zoning, see James Wickersham, Note, The
Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model for State Growth Management Statutes,
18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489 (1994). Although local zoning remains the dominant model for
land use regulation in the United States, several other states in addition to Vermont have
adopted statutes requiring state oversight of local land use decision-making. One example is
Oregon, which adopted the State Land Use Act in 1973. See OR. REv. STAT. § 197 (1997). In
Oregon, local governments must submit comprehensive plans and land use regulations to a state
agency that reviews them for compliance with state planning goals. See MANDELKER &
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 32, at 872. Once a local plan receives-state approval, the local
government retains primary responsibility for day-to-day land use decisions. See Gay, supra
note 16, at 16. In the late 1980s through 1993, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, and Washington adopted programs similar to the Oregon model. See Wickersham,
supra, at 490-9 .
91. See Wickersham, supra note 90, at 493.
92. See id. In addition, the zoning code may further subdivide the municipality into zones
for single or multifamily residential uses, small shops or office complex uses, and light or
heavy industrial uses. See id.
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throughout each zone, but may vary from one zone to another. 93
Subject to judicial review, a local board of adjustment may rule on
requests for special exceptions to the terms of an ordinance and may
also authorize variances from a zoning ordinance when, due to
special conditions, literal enforcement of the ordinance would cause
unnecessary hardship.94 Standing in zoning cases is strictly limited to
property owners, adjoining land owners, and other parties whose
interests are immediately affected.
95
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL VERSUS LOCAL CONTROL OF
LAND USE DECISIONS: INRE WAL-MART STORES, INC. AND FORTE V.
BOROUGH OF TENAFLY
The Vermont Supreme Court's conclusion that a project's effect
on market competition may justify denial of an Act 250 permit
contradicts a well-established zoning law norm: control of
competition is not a proper zoning purpose.96 Zoning laws must
satisfy the substantive limitations imposed by the due process
clause.97 Therefore, zoning restrictions must "advance legitimate
governmental objectives that serve the public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare."98 Courts generally will uphold a zoning
restriction that incidentally affects competition if it achieves other
legitimate zoning objectives.99
93. See MANDELKER, supra note 11, § 4.17.
94. See id. §4.19.
95. See Wickersham, supra note 90, at 493.
96. See MANDELKER, supra note 11, § 5.28.
97. See id. § 2.39.
98. Id.
99. See id. § 5.38. However, if a competitor attempts to use zoning law solely to shield its
competitive position, a court is likely to hold that the competitor lacks standing to challenge the
zoning restriction. See, e.g., Circle Lounge & Grill, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 86 N.E.2d 920
(Mass. 1949). In Circle Lounge & Grill, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, Circle Lounge, which was
located in a commercial zone, challenged a zoning variance granted to a restaurant in a
residential zone across the street from Circle Lounge. See id. The Circle Lounge court held that
the threat of competition from the restaurant did not confer standing upon Circle Lounge to
challenge the variance. See id. at 922. The court found that, although homeowners in the
residential district could object to a variance for commercial use in their district, Circle Lounge
could not because it was located in a less restrictive commercial district across the street and,
thus, was not a "person aggrieved." Id. at 924.
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Forte v. Borough of Tenafly1°° is a decision in which a court,
applying zoning law principles, found a legitimate governmental
objective, even though the challenged zoning ordinance might have
incidentally restrained competition.'0 1 It serves as a useful contrast to
the In re Wal-Mart decision because it suggests how courts, applying
zoning law principles, might rule on a case similar to In re Wal-Mart
if it were to arise in another state. In Forte, the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, upheld the constitutionality of a
zoning amendment that restricted retail sales to a central business
area where the purpose of the ordinance was to revitalize the business
district.1
0 2
The plaintiffs in Forte, who were owners of a parcel of land
situated outside of the central business area, sought to build a
supermarket on their property and applied to the local planning board
for the necessary permit and approvals.10 3 At the time of the
plaintiffs' application, the zoning district in which their property was
located permitted such a use.1°4  However, based on the
recommendations of planning consultants and the planning board, the
local governing body thereafter adopted a zoning amendment that
created a new zoning district encompassing plaintiffs' property.1
0 5
The amendment forbade construction within the new district of any
commercial or wholesale establishment that would adversely affect
the district's central business core.106 The purpose of the amendment
was to preserve the borough's downtown center by discouraging the
spread of retail businesses to outlying areas. 107 The Forte plaintiffs
immediately instituted an action to have the zoning amendment
declared invalid.'08 Although the trial court initially invalidated the
100. 255 A.2d 804 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
101. Seeid.
102. See id. at 807.
103. See id. at 805.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Seeid.
108. See id. The borough contended that the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiffs'
action because the plaintiffs had failed to apply for a zoning variance. See id. On appeal,
however, the court concluded that, given the circumstances, it would have been futile to apply
for a variance, and, therefore, plaintiffs proceeded properly by bringing their action. See id.
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
342 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 54:323
amendment, the appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that
the borough, in an effort to preserve and revitalize the central
business area, could zone to restrict retail sales in the rest of the
municipality. 0 9 The fact that the ordinance might have the incidental
effect of conferring a virtual monopoly on the central business area
did not invalidate it. 10 Moreover, the appellate court found that the
amended zoning classification was not invalid as applied to the
plaintiffs' property, even though it denied them the opportunity to
operate a retail grocery store on their property. The plaintiffs'
retained the right to use their property for any purpose permitted by
the ordinance.'11
Forte suggests that a decision similar to In re Wal-Mart could
occur outside of Vermont, but that the case would arise differently.
First, a municipality could not zone to prohibit construction of a Wal-
Mart or other similar store because of its potentially harmful effects
on existing businesses." 2 To survive substantive due process
scrutiny, the ordinance must advance legitimate zoning purposes,
namely the protection of the public health, safety and welfare.' '3
Interestingly, the Vermont Supreme Court, in In re Wal-Mart,
concluded that a proposed store's potentially harmful competition,
which might threaten a municipality's tax base, provides a sufficient
nexus with legitimate governmental interests for the government to
regulate it."4 However, based on Forte, this rationale probably will
not suffice under zoning law principles. A municipality may not zone
to exclude a particular store merely because it will compete with
existing businesses." 5 The zoning restriction must further a
legitimate zoning purpose such as revitalizing a downtown business
district."
6
Moreover, standing to challenge a zoning ordinance that would
permit construction of a Wal-Mart or similar store in a particular
109. See id. at 807.
110. See id.
111. Seeid.
112. See MANDELKER, supra note 11, § 5.28.
113. See id. § 2.39.
114. See In re Wal-Mart, 702 A.2d 397.
115. See MANDELKER, supra note 11, § 5.28.
116. See id. § 2.39.
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district would be strictly limited. Only abutting property owners, or
others whose interests are immediately affected by the zoning
decision, will likely be pennitted to challenge it.1 7 This latter
category would include residents of the district who would be
adversely impacted by the increased traffic caused by new
commercial development, but probably not the owners of cross-town
businesses whose customers may be drawn away by the new store.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's conclusion in In re Wal-Mart that it may be
appropriate to consider a proposed project's effects on competition
has implications for new commercial development beyond Vermont.
Nevertheless, the impact of this decision will necessarily be limited
by the fact that it interprets a unique state land use statute that
specifically mandates review of the economic costs associated with
new developments that satisfy minimum jurisdictional
requirements." 8 Although In re Wal-Mart offers some hope to small
towns struggling to withstand economic plunder from large discount
retailers, that hope must be tempered with reality: zoning law
probably does not offer the same assurances as Vermont's Act 250. It
remains to be seen whether In re Wal-Mart is a foreshadowing of
events to come or merely the most recent manifestation of
Vermonters' hearty individualism.
Sheny Keymer Dreisewerd
117. See Wickersham, supra note 90, at 493.
118. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1997).
* J.D. 1998, Washington University.
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